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Abstract  
Commentators have poured forth a loud and sustained outcry over the past few years that 
sees property rule treatment of  intellectual property (IP) as a cause of  excessive transaction costs, 
thickets, anticommons, hold-ups, hold-outs, and trolls, which unduly tax and retard innovation, 
competition, and economic growth.  The popular response has been to seek a legislative shift 
towards some limited use of  weaker, liability rule treatment, usually portrayed as “just enough” to 
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facilitate transactions in those special cases where the bargaining problems are at their worst and 
where escape hatches are most needed.  This essay is designed to make two contributions.  First, it 
shows how a set of  changes in case law over just the past few years have hugely re-shaped the patent 
system from having several major, and helpful, liability-rule-pressure-release-valves, into a system 
that is fast becoming almost devoid of  significant property rule characteristics, at least for those 
small entities that would most need property rule protection.  The essay then explores some harmful 
effects of  this shift, focusing on the ways liability rule treatment can seriously impede the beneficial 
deal-making mechanisms that facilitate innovation and competition.  The basic intuition behind this 
bad effect of  liability rules is that they seriously frustrate the ability for a market-challenging 
patentee to attract and hold the constructive attention of  a potential contracting party (especially 
one that is a larger more established party) while preserving the option to terminate the negotiations 
in favor of  striking a deal with a different party.  At the same time, liability rules can have an 
additional bad effect of  helping existing competitors to coordinate with each other over ways to 
keep out new entrants.  The essay is designed to contribute to the literature on IP in particular, as 
well as the broader literatures on property and coordination, by first showing how a seemingly 
disconnected set of  changes to the legal rules impacting a particular legal regime like the patent 
system can have unintended and sweeping harmful consequences, and then by exploring why within 
the more middle range of  the spectrum between the two poles of  property rules and liability rules, a 
general shift towards the property side may be preferred by those seeking an increase in access and 
competition.   
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KIEFF REMOVING PROPERTY FROM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 
 
II. The Patent System’s Liability Rules...........................................................................................................9 
A. Liability Rules Long in Use..................................................................................................................9 
1. Corporate Law, Bankruptcy Law, Litigation.............................................................................10 
2. Uncertain Enforcement Mechanisms .......................................................................................13 
3. Experimental Use and the Hatch-Waxman Act ......................................................................14 
4. Acts of  Infringement by or for the Government ...................................................................15 
B. Liability Rules Recently Added..........................................................................................................16 
1. Injunctions Eliminated by the eBay Case ..................................................................................17 
2. Enhanced Damages Eliminated by the Seagate Case ...............................................................18 
3. Expanded Hatch-Waxman Immunity by the Merck Case.......................................................20 
4. Increased Uncertainty by KSR, Bilski, and Other Cases.........................................................21 
III. How Liability Rules Frustrate Deals .......................................................................................................24 
A. Direct Impact of  Recent Changes from Property to Liability Rules ..........................................25 
B. Other Deal Breaking Changes in Rules about Patent Contracts .................................................28 
1. Inability to Settle or Avoid Litigation after the Medimmune Case ..........................................28 
2. Disincentive to Settle or Avoid Litigation after the Quanta Case..........................................31 
IV. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................36 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Getting resources put to use by market actors requires them to interact with each other and 
with various government actors in various ways, depending on the set of  applicable laws, rules, and 
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norms (collectively, “institutions”), and their enforcement characteristics.  This paper uses the set of  
analytical tools from the field generally called new institutional economics (“NIE”)2 to offer a 
comparative analysis of  the various interaction mechanisms that result when the applicable 
institutions governing private sector entitlements take on the essential features of  one of  two 
stylized types that can be seen as property rights “at their best” and “at their worst.”3  Property 
rights are considered to be at their best when they are “easy to predict and find; easy to bundle and 
divide; structured so that those concerned with the subject matter that the right protects can and 
should deal directly with the private owner holding the right; and not readily reconfigured by a judge 
or other government decision-maker,” and are at their worst “when they have fixed owners who are 
not freely able to contract over them[,] and when their contours can be changed either only at the 
discretion of  government actors or too easily at the discretion of  government actors, which puts 
those interested in the subject matter the rights protect in the position of  needing to deal with the 
relevant government decision-makers.”4   
These distinctions boil down to two main areas: transactions and enforcements.  The 
transaction distinctions can be seen as being focused on encouraging market actors to directly 
transact mostly with each other or mostly with government actors.  The enforcement distinctions are 
                                                
2 See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN 
THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION 1 (1975) (representative early work using the term NIE); Ronald Coase, The 
New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72 (1998).   
3 See, Stephen H. Haber, et al., On the Importance to Economic Success of  Property Rights in Finance and Innovation, 26 WASH U. J. 
L. & POL’Y 215 (2008) (discussing examples from finance and innovation of  property rights “at their best” and “at their 
worst,” from symposium on “Law & The New Institutional Economics”).   
4 Id. at 216.  
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generally labeled by the law and economics and NIE literatures as either “property rules” or “liability 
rules.”  Property rules are seen as designed to generally keep an entitlement in the hands of  its 
owner unless the owner consents to use or transfer; and emblematic property rules include 
injunctions designed to prevent such use or transfer, and enhanced damages designed to deter them.  
Conversely, liability rules are seen as designed to allow infringement when the owner refuses 
consent, or when the owner is not even asked, and generally require the non-owner merely to pay, 
after a lawsuit the property owner elected to bring and maintain, whatever amount of  money the 
property owner proves in court to be attributable to the objectively measured damages caused by the 
infringement.5  While most debates about property and IP focus on questions of  how many 
property rights would be best, generally with owners demanding more property rights and users 
demanding fewer, this paper focuses attention instead on the different question of  how these 
entitlements are structured, with an eye towards facilitating mechanisms for diverse sets of  
complementary users of  an asset to coordinate with each other over ways to get the asset put to ever 
higher and better uses while frustrating mechanisms for existing competitors to coordinate with each 
other over ways to keep out new entrants.  
                                                
5 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of  the Cathedral, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).   Of  course, even property rules allow for compelled transfer by a host of  mechanisms 
such as takings accompanied by just compensation, and even property rules contemplate a degree of  liability in the form of  
either enhanced damages or just compensation; and even liability rules discourage taking to the extent of  the risk of  judgment 
enforcement and collection for mere objective damages.  The difference is both a matter of  degree as well as the mechanisms 
by which such transfers are modulated; yet while the labels are thereby hugely imperfect, they are so well accepted in the law 
and economics literature that their use easily conveys sufficient meaning to those familiar with these fields. 
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In focusing on these mechanisms, this essay does not endeavor to propound any new theory, 
definition, or even to stretch existing ones.  Nor does this essay endeavor to address broader debates 
about whether predictability in and of  itself  is always better or worse than flexibility, whether rules 
are always better or worse than standards.  Nor does it argue or even suggest that property rules are 
always better than liability rules, that more property is always better than less, or that property 
owners like patentees should always win their lawsuits, or always get more or stronger remedies 
when they do win. Rather, this essay uses the already-established literature about the types of  rules 
governing legal entitlements and their enforcement characteristics, including in particular those 
works exploring the paradigmatic features of  property rights and property rules in addition to those 
exploring liability rules and their functional equivalents to highlight some under-explored and 
pernicious consequences of  present trends in both the literature and the cases.   
In the vast majority of  the intellectual property (IP) literature, property rule treatment of  IP 
is said to cause excessive transaction costs, thickets, anticommons, hold-ups, hold-outs, and trolls, 
unduly taxing and retarding innovation, competition, and economic growth.  The popular view of  
IP for the past several years has been that property rule treatment is stopping deals from getting 
done, leaving desired users of  IP subject matter unable to engage in sufficient productive activities.  
For example, the injunction infamously sought against the provider of  the BlackBerry service was 
said to threaten ongoing operations at the upper echelons of  the American business, non-profit, and 
government sectors, which were staffed by VIP’s who had come to so depend on the devices that 
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the nickname Crackberry was spawned.6  To hear some tell it, one might have thought the American 
Way of  Life was at stake and executive levels of  our society would shut down if  the injunction had 
been granted.7   
In response, many commentators suggested trying to solve these important problems of  
property by only slightly shifting towards some limited use of  liability rule treatment or some slight 
shift towards more reliance on mandating or prohibiting certain terms in contracts.  The idea was to 
facilitate transactions in those targeted cases where the bargaining problems are at their worst and 
where escape hatches are most needed.   
One well-known problem with such a targeted response is that the number of  targets is 
actually not small.  Property can face serious pitfalls when the negotiations it would require involve 
one or both sides being made up of  a large number of  parties, thereby triggering problems of  
coordination, free-riding, holdouts, etc., such as when a large number of  users would each require 
permissions from a large number of  IP owners.  Property’s pitfalls also can be serious when the two 
sides of  the negotiation are each individuals, who would still face problems of  bilateral monopoly, 
strategic behavior, and cognitive biases. And mixed sized models raise a mix of  both sets of  
                                                
6 Blackberry maker Research in Motion is reputed to have strategically targeted such VIP’s for free devices as a marketing 
ploy, recognizing that if  the leadership of  an organization liked the devices it would both increase the willingness of  the 
organization to invest in the infrastructure needed to support them and at the same time lend a level of  prestige to having the 
devices.   
7 See, e.g., Ian Austen, Bye Bye Blackberry?; A Patent Dispute Threatens To Cut Executives Off, N.Y. TIMES Dec. 3, 2005, at C1; 
Jane Spencer & Jessica E. Vascellaro, Imagining a Day Without BlackBerrys --- Possibility of  Shutdown Has Some Users Panicking, Others 
Dreaming of  Freedom, WALL ST. J. Jan. 25, 2006, at D1.   
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problems.8  But focusing on efforts to determine which of  these situations should be targeted first 
would be a tragic mistake because a more troubling problem has crept up.   
This essay argues that just as Jonathan Swift’s A Modest Proposal was a less than forthright 
title for its suggestion that the 18th Century Irish poor sell their children as food for the rich, the calls 
for seemingly modest and targeted reforms in the patent system over the past few years by 
innovation’s discontents9 have not sufficiently acknowledged the important role played by liability 
rules long present in the patent system or the ways in which the reforms they were pushing would 
almost remove property rule treatment from this area of  IP, almost remove the ability for private 
actors to contract directly with each other on their own terms, and ultimately shift this area of  IP 
towards a legal regime characterized by property rights at their worst.  Part II of  this essay begins the 
discussion by elucidating the several major, and largely helpful, liability-rule-pressure-release-valves 
that were already built into the patent system and the recent changes that have all but stripped away 
those few significant property rule characteristics that were remaining.  Part III then explores some 
pernicious effects of  this shift by focusing on the ways liability rule treatment can seriously impede 
the beneficial deal-making mechanisms that facilitate innovation and competition.  The basic 
intuition behind this bad effect of  liability rules is that they seriously frustrate the ability for a 
market-challenging patentee to attract and hold the constructive attention of  a potential contracting 
                                                
8 See, e.g., James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 440, 450-51 (1995).   
9 Many of  the reform proponents rely on the book by economists Adam Jaffee and Josh Lerner called INNOVATION AND 
ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT (2004).   
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party (especially one that is a larger more established party) while preserving the option to terminate 
the negotiations in favor of  striking a deal with a different party.  The discussion also elucidates the 
way other related and recent shifts in the law governing contracts over patents further frustrate the 
ability to strike such pro-competitive, pro-innovation helpful deals.  Part IV concludes.   
 
II. THE PATENT SYSTEM’S LIABILITY RULES 
Liability rules are no stranger to the patent system.  Liability rule treatment is expressly 
provided in a number of  areas within patent law and a number of  other areas of  patent law have 
liability rule effect.  In addition, patents are enforced only against a backdrop of  general civil law, 
which itself  contains a number of  tools that effectively keep enforcement of  an entitlement like an 
IP right limited to liability rule treatment in many contexts.     
A. Liability Rules Long in Use  
Most property rights systems recognize that an absolute right to exclude backed up by 
inexpensive, immediate, certain, and powerful enforcement could lead to serious risk that socially 
productive uses might be prevented or deterred, or that other collateral costs might be realized.  For 
this reason, even most systems of  real or personal property have a host of  mechanisms for allowing 
trespass to occur without imposing an immediate death sentence.  The patent system also has long 
recognized that it can be helpful to allow some extent of  liability rule treatment, as a tool for 
facilitating some transactions.  While there are a number of  these liability rule provisions, they are 
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not redundant or identical.  Rather, each operates on its own terms and is the product of  diverse 
debate and careful evolution. 
1. Corporate Law, Bankruptcy Law, Litigation 
One of  the most important, but also most overlooked, sources of  liability rule impact on the 
patent system are the generally applicable bodies of  law relating to the corporate form, bankruptcy, 
and litigation.  Indeed, it has been those often seen as being on the so-called pro-property side of  
the debates about IP who have pointed out this effect, and even urged its importance to certain 
types of  deal structures.10  Because these areas of  general commercial law exist largely independent 
of  any one area of  entitlement-creating law such as IP, it would be a stretch to say that these areas 
of  law are part of  IP in the narrow sense; but they do operate to burnish down the sharp edges one 
might otherwise imagine would be associated with IP.  They also were very much on the mind of  the 
leading champions of  the long-operating version of  our patent system – the 1952 Patent Act – since 
those champions – such as Judges Learned Hand and Jerome Frank – were at the same time leading 
voices in debates about commercial law generally.   
While relatively new to the IP literature, the general finance and liability literatures have long 
focused on the ways the limited liability offered to shareholders under the corporate form11 can be 
                                                
10  See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) 
(general importance); F. Scott Kieff  & Troy A. Paredes, Engineering a Deal: Toward a Private Ordering Solution to the Anticommons 
Problem, 47 BOSTON COLLEGE L. REV. 111 (2006) (particular deal structure).   
11 For more on limited liability, see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 
U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 105–06 (1985); Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate 
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combined with the ability to seek protection from the bankruptcy laws to allow for a number of  so-
called judgment-proofing strategies such as sale-leasebacks, doing business through subsidiaries, 
franchising, off-shore asset sequestration, secured debt, and traditional asset securitization, that may 
each have the effect of  eliminating legal liability.12  These techniques are equally available against 
                                                                                                                                                       
Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329 (2004); Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of  Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 
102 YALE L.J. 387 (1992); Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of  Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 
117 (1980); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 
(1991); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991); Henry G. Manne, Our 
Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 261–65 (1967); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: 
Direct and Vicarious Liability of  Corporate Participants for Torts of  the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1994).  While the focus here is 
on corporations, limited partners in a limited partnership and members in a limited liability company also enjoy the benefits of  
limited liability. 
12 For a sampling of  the literature on judgment proofing, on which this chapter’s discussion of  the subject builds, see, e.g., 
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of  Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996) [hereinafter LoPucki, Death of  Liability]; Lynn M. LoPucki, The 
Essential Structure of  Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REV. 147 (1998) [hereinafter LoPucki, Essential Structure]; Lynn M. LoPucki, 
The Irrefutable Logic of  Judgment Proofing: A Reply to Professor Schwarcz, 52 STAN. L. REV. 55 (1999) [hereinafter LoPucki, Irrefutable 
Logic]; Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413 (1998) [hereinafter LoPucki, Virtual Judgment 
Proofing]; Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Judgment Proofing, Bankruptcy Policy, and the Dark Side of  Tort Liability, 52 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1999); 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 52 STAN. L. REV. 77 (1999) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Rejoinder]; Steven L. 
Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of  Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Inherent Irrationality]; 
Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof  Problem, 6 INT’L REV. OF L. & ECON. 45 (1986) [hereinafter Shavell, Judgment Proof  Problem]; 
James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki’s The Death of  Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363 (1998); Steven 
Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements and Compulsory Liability Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-Proof  Problem (Harvard, John M. 
Olin Discussion Paper No. 456, 2004), at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/456.pdf  [hereinafter 
Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements].   
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patent infringement judgments, and indeed many are used by parties anticipating or engaged in 
patent litigation.   
In addition, judgment proofing against tort creditors like patentees can be particularly easy – 
essentially all that need be done is operate within an outrage constraint.13  For example, as long as 
those running the infringing business respect the corporate form and pay themselves non-fraudulent 
wages and dividends, etc., they will be able to derive a vast amount of  money and other benefits 
from an infringing business before an infringement lawsuit is brought and won and its judgment 
collected, and then they will be able to keep those gains from getting hauled back into the 
infringement estate.   
An interesting question for further research might be to study why these techniques are not 
used even more widely.  While some have suggested that such fears over the death of  formal legal 
liability are overstated, because, for example, a parent corporation would rationally elect to pay for 
the debts of  its subsidiary out of  an interest in preserving goodwill and reputation, some recent 
decisions to not pay in the cases involving sex abuse charges against the Catholic Church and alleged 
human rights violations in Nigeria by a subsidiary of  Chevron suggest the reputational constraints 
may not bind.14  The bottom line for infringers is that as a practical matter they may not be on the 
hook, at least not for the full amount, even if  they are found to have infringed.   
Even when the careful corporate structuring and planning needed to reduce liability have not 
been taken, the award of  liability can be significantly deterred or delayed by the ordinary process of  
                                                
13 That is, avoid behavior that is so totally outrageous that it would generate some type of  social backlash.   
14 I thank Lynn LoPucki for pointing this out.  See also, Lynn M. LoPucki, Toward a Trademark-Based Liability System, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1099, 1131-34, n. 153 (2002).   
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civil litigation.  Patents are wasting assets in that they only remain in force for up to about 17 years, 
and for most patents it is not until several years into patent term that the patented technology even 
becomes commercially significant.  Meanwhile, trying a patent case typically takes at least three to 
five years; and the appeal typically adds another two to three years.  If  the patent suit is not likely to 
end before patent expiration, any threat of  injunction will significantly decrease if  not become a 
nullity.     
Cost also is a significant deterrent.  Patent litigation typically costs each side three to five 
million dollars, although it is not rare for cases to take more than five years and cost each side twenty 
to thirty million dollars.  Much hay is made by commentators about the threat of  damages awards in 
patent cases frequently reaching into the hundreds of  millions and sometimes billions of  dollars.  
But regardless of  its size, no judgment is likely to be worth more than the amount that can actually 
be collected and the judgment proofing strategies can keep collections to a minimum.  Decisions to 
pursue litigation have to weigh the certainty of  the several million dollars in litigation expenses 
against the possibility of  collecting on a judgment as well as the possibility of  the judgment being 
awarded.   
2. Uncertain Enforcement Mechanisms 
As Ayres and Klemperer point out, uncertainty and delay in the patent system has the same 
effect as liability rule treatment.15  While Ayres and Klemperer were complaining about the large 
                                                
15 Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of  
Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 92 (1999) (criticizing the crispness of  the present patent system).   
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degree of  certainty in the system, Lemley and Shapiro explore the many ways in which the system is 
properly seen as a probabilistic game of  great uncertainty.16  
3. Experimental Use and the Hatch-Waxman Act 
Some commentators have long suggested that patent law should permit non-commercial, 
experimental use of  a patented invention as an exception to infringement under a so-called 
experimental use exemption or research use exemption.  To the extent this doctrine exists, it was 
severely limited in the case of  Roche v. Bolar,17 in which the court held that limited experimental use 
by a generic drug company to obtain Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for use after 
the patent expired was an infringing use.   
Congress responded to Roche with the enactment of  the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, which 
added Section 271(e) to the Patent Act, and which essentially deems activities reasonably related to 
FDA approval to be non-infringing, so as to streamline FDA approval of  so-called Abbreviated 
New Drug Applications (ANDA’s).  At the same time, the Act requires the sponsor of  the ANDA 
to make a certification that the drug will not infringe any valid claim and deems the filing of  such a 
certification to be a jurisdictionally-creating act of  infringement so that a patentee can bring suit on 
the patent during the FDA approval process and if  victorious, keep the competition from coming to 
market until after the patent expires.  At the same time, the competition is allowed to make progress 
on obtaining FDA approval before expiration of  the patent so that he is ready to come to market 
soon after expiration.  Thus, in the field of  biotechnology, the experimental use exception has been 
                                                
16 Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 (2005).   
17 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).   
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viewed as rather liberal, but restrained by the mechanisms of  the Hatch-Waxman Act; and in other 
fields of  technology the exception is very limited by the holding of  Roche, if  the exception exists at 
all.   
It makes sense for the research use exemption to be limited because it turns out that most 
research uses are in effect permitted via a different mechanism than some formal legal rule of  
excuse or exception.  The transaction costs of  dealing with a patentee’s right to exclude are not 
carried entirely by those wanting to obtain permission for use.  Unlike the copyright system, the 
patent system does not have criminal liability or statutory damages and so the costs of  enforcement 
for patents are born by the property owner.  The presence of  these significant enforcement costs 
and the lack of  significant enforcement benefits in many cases, especially those against low value 
users for whom damages are likely to be low and even high value users who are judgment proof  or 
judgment remote, combine to make it rational for patentees to greatly under-enforce.  Importantly, 
the theory just reviewed is born out by the facts.  Empirical studies of  the impact patents have had 
on basic scientists, for example, have shown that very large numbers of  low value infringements are 
routinely allowed for free.18   
4. Acts of  Infringement by or for the Government  
As demonstrated in the infamous post-9/11 anthrax scare during which the federal 
government wanted the owner of  the patent on Cipro to provide large quantities of  the drug at a 
low price, the federal and state governments have some protection from infringement by the 
                                                
18 Timothy Caulfield, Robert M. Cook-Deegan, F. Scott Kieff, & John P. Walsh, Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis Of  
Human Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 1091 (2006). 
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doctrine of  sovereign immunity.  The Federal Government is subject to suit in the United States 
Court of  Claims by a patentee for “his reasonable and entire compensation”19 but not for an 
injunction.  In the case of  Cipro in the post-9/11 anthrax scare, the Government’s threat to either 
make the drug or have it made was enough to get Bayer, the patentee, to drop its price and increase 
its output.  To be sure, decisions to do this are cabined by the political process as well as the 
constitutional and statutory requirements that the government pay just compensation, but as seen in 
cases like Kelo, that outrage constraint does not always bind and parties in need of  use are welcome 
to simply ask the government to make the decision to infringe or to arrange for the infringement.   
State governments also are immune.  The Supreme Court decided that state governments 
were immune from suit for patent infringement and that Congressional efforts to abrogate that 
immunity were unconstitutional under the 11th Amendment.20  While state officials likely may be 
enjoined,21 they may not be personally sued for those patent infringements that are properly part of  
their official acts.   
B. Liability Rules Recently Added  
While the patent system had long contained the mix of  property and liability rules described 
above, the mix was radically shifted over the past few years with a slew of  high profile cases that 
                                                
19 28 USC § 1498.  This may either be seen as a limited waiver of  sovereign immunity or as a statute that assigns 
jurisdiction for a cause of  action that exists as of  right to seek just compensation for a taking under the 5th Amendment.  
Compare Zoltek.   
20 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).   
21 Ex Part Young.   
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have almost decimated the property rules remaining in the system.  These many new, and 
overlapping, liability rules are each discussed below.   
1. Those Injunctions Eliminated by the eBay Case 
For a long time, a central part of  the value in a patent was the credible threat of  an 
injunction.  But the recent Supreme Court decision in eBay may weaken this long-standing practice.22  
Some see this case as having raised the bar for patentees seeking an injunction after there has been a 
full adjudication of  patent validity and infringement by injecting more discretion in the 
determination of  essentially whether an injunction is in the broadly defined public interest. Others 
see the case as merely restating the established practice that an injunction should issue once validity 
and infringement have been decided in court.  In the final analysis, the full impact of  the eBay case 
remains an open question for debate.23   
But in the short term it looks as if  even the Federal Circuit is treating the case as making it 
very hard to get an injunction except if  the patentee is a large manufacturing entity.24  In October of  
                                                
22 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006).   
23 For more on why and how the eBay decision’s four-factor test for injunctions should not be read to be such an open 
ended analysis, see F. Scott Kieff, & Henry E. Smith, How Not to Invent a Patent Crisis, in REACTING TO THE SPENDING SPREE: 
POLICY CHANGES WE CAN AFFORD, Terry L. Anderson and Richard Sousa, eds., Hoover Institution Press, 2009; Stanford Law 
and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 384; Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 10-02. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496990, at 68-69.   
24 Even manufacturing entities who are awarded injunctions, like TiVo, may still face uncertainty over the practical impact 
of  such an injunction, depending on what the en banc Federal Circuit does in TiVo, v. Echostar, 376 Fed.Appx. 21 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (order granting petition for rehearing en banc). 
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2007 the court issued an opinion in Paice v. Toyota affirming the power of  a district court to impose a 
post verdict “ongoing royalty” on future sales of  a product adjudicated to infringe a patent 
adjudicated to be not invalid after a full trial by sophisticated and well financed defendants.25  The 
court took pains to write that this was merely an “ongoing royalty” and “not a compulsory license” 
because it did not apply to non-parties to the lawsuit.  What the court seems to overlook is that the 
defendant elected to be a party by electing to infringe and the patentee was compelled to be a party 
and compelled to accept the royalty, leaving open the suggestion to future parties interested in this 
and other patents that the season for infringement is open.  It’s hard to imagine why other large auto 
manufacturers won’t see the deal Toyota got as a green light to infringe.   
2. Those Enhanced Damages Eliminated by the Seagate Case 
The victorious patentee in an infringement suit is supposed to be awarded at least actual, 
objective, damages “adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty.”26  In the past, the patentee also was generally able to receive enhanced damages 
for willfulness, which is a question of  fact to be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and which 
if  found by fact-finder would then leave within the judge’s discretion a decision about whether to 
treble damages and award attorney fees.27   
                                                                                                                                                       
.   
25 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 2007).   
26 35 USC § 284. 
27 35 USC §§ 284-85. 
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However, the ability for patentees to obtain enhanced damages for willfulness may have been 
significantly curtailed by the Federal Circuit August 2007 decision in Seagate.28  In that case, the 
Federal Circuit seemed to have established a new requirement for proving willful infringement, a 
showing of  “objective recklessness” on the part of  the infringer, based on a two step test: (1) the 
infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions infringed a valid patent, treating 
the infringer’s subjective state of  mind as irrelevant; and then (2) that the objectively high risk was 
either known or should have been known to the infringer.29 The court took pains to emphasize that 
“[b]ecause we abandon the affirmative duty of  due care, we also reemphasize that there is no 
affirmative obligation to obtain opinion of  counsel.”30 The court also strongly suggested that a 
substantial question regarding infringement or validity that is sufficient to avoid a preliminary 
injunction also is likely sufficient to avoid a willful infringement finding.   But because permanent 
injunctions are likely to be significantly harder to obtain after eBay, the preliminary injunctions 
contemplated by Seagate are even more unlikely.  In addition, because the general substantive 
uncertainty discussed above, especially when enhanced by the added uncertainty discussed below, is 
likely to leave most patent infringement cases in a bad position for a preliminary injunction, the new 
Seagate test probably means that all those cases now are also in a correspondingly bad position for 
enhanced damages.  Put differently, after Seagate, it is hard to imagine a patentee who can win 
enhanced damages regardless of  the notice he gives the defendant.   
                                                
28 See In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
29 Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. 
30 Id.  
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3. Expanded Hatch-Waxman Immunity by the Merck Case 
The common law research use exemption discussed above seems to have been reaffirmed 
recently to be extremely narrow in exempting only those uses that are “for amusement, to satisfy idle 
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.”31  For academic researchers, who do much if  not all 
of  their work in furtherance of  philosophical inquiry, the legal test in essence allows only for a very 
limited amount of  research to be conducted on patented technologies to confirm whether they work 
as described in the patent. It does not allow for the user of  a patented technology to be legally 
exempt from infringing simply because their use has to do with research or is for research purposes. 
The distinction here is between researching with and researching on, which basically distinguishes 
between a business purpose that would not be exempt and a purely philosophical interest that could 
be. The bottom line is that only a limited number of  uses to genuinely test whether a patented 
technology works will be good candidates for the common law exemption. 
Nevertheless, and despite the clear legislative intent to limit the Hatch-Waxman Act’s 
exemption for infringement, the Supreme Court in the recent Merck case treated the statutory 
exemption so broadly that the Court gave a free pass from infringement for work relating to 
preclinical studies of  a new drug seeking FDA approval.32 A careful reading of  the Merck decision 
would of  course not extend its impact beyond the narrow facts of  the case.  Any other view would 
not only be an overly strained reading of  the opinion; but it also would undercut the important 
policies of  the patent system. But the language of  the Merck opinion seems to suggest that the 
                                                
31 Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).   
32 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).   
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statutory exemption now is not limited only to the development of  information for submission to 
the FDA and that instead Congress “exempted from infringement all uses of  patented compounds 
‘reasonably related’ to the process of  developing information for submission under any federal law 
regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of  drugs.”33  This language seems to cover almost 
any use by any company that is in some way regulated by the government, and which therefore may 
reasonably be anticipating submitting data to a regulatory body.   
4. Increased Uncertainty by KSR, Bilski, and Other Cases  
Two key areas of  the law allocating or awarding the initial patent entitlement have undergone 
a dramatic increase in uncertainty in the past year.  The first relates to the patent law requirement of  
nonobviousness and the second relates to the requirement of  statutory subject matter.   
The April 2007 US Supreme Court decision in KSR is seen by many as having raised the bar 
for the nonobviousness standard by injecting more discretion into the determination of  this central 
issue for most patent cases.34  The central issue presented in KSR is whether expert opinion 
testimony in court when adopted at the discretion of  a federal judge is enough to prove what would 
have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art of  the patentee at the time in history 
when the patentee made an invention. Patent critics see the KSR case as standing for the proposition 
that government decision-makers like judges now have increased discretion to pronounce what the 
prior art teaches; and they applaud that result, hoping to see it applied in court and during initial 
Patent Office examination. For example, examiners would be able to block patents on the basis of  
                                                
33 Merck, 545 U.S. at 206.   
34 See KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). 
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their own assertions about what the state of  the art was at a particular time in history, without 
having to rely on the factual proof, such as documents and sample products, which has long been 
required. Others think the case was narrowly decided on its facts and that the relevant inquiry 
remains an objective determination of  precisely what was taught by the particular combination of  
relevant pieces of  prior art.  If  the case is ready broadly, then it injects a great degree of  flexibility 
into the nonobviousness analysis.   
Similarly, the Federal Circuit has just recently issued three opinions that inject a great degree 
of  flexibility and uncertainty into the law of  statutory subject matter.  The Supreme Court and 
Federal Circuit formerly treated as patentable subject matter “anything under the sun made by 
man.”35  In a case that effectively opened up the field of  computer programs to patent protection, 
the Federal Circuit in banc upheld as directed to statutory subject matter a patent claim on a 
computer program for printing a smooth curve on a compute screen.36  Then, in a case that 
effectively opened up the field of  financial services to patent protection, the court did the same for a 
patent on a hub-and-spoke mutual fund accounting system, disposing of  the so-called algorithm and 
business method exceptions to patentable subject matter.37  Thus, until recently, the touchstone for 
patentable subject matter had been merely that the claimed invention must cause come concrete and 
tangible result, and as a result, patentable subject matter itself  presents a very low hurdle to 
patentability.   
                                                
35 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).  See also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
36 See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994)(in banc). 
37 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999).   
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This all changed in September 2007, when the court issued its decision in In re Comisky.38  
This decision seems to limit the scope of  the State Street Bank decision by requiring a pure mental 
process be connected to a machine (e.g., a computer) in order for a claim to recite subject matter 
that can be patentable.  As a result of  this decision, patent drafters and inventors of  mental 
processes will be required to combine a particular technology such as a computer with such mental 
processes for the subject matter to meet the statutory requirement of  patentable subject matter. 
While this seems like an easy decision to draft around, it is strikingly similar to the slippery slope we 
previously occupied in the 1970’s and 1980’s during which we effectively made every software patent 
subject to discretionary review for being too close to a mental step and therefore invalid.  Indeed, in 
a case handed down the same day as Comisky, In re Nuijten,39the Federal Circuit examined the 
patentability of  claims to a digital watermark for a computer data file simply declared it to be not 
within any patentable subject matter.  While some may have thought that Comisky and Nuitjen were 
outliers, the Federal Circuit’s October 30, 2008 in banc decision in Bilski seems to all but fully 
jettison the approach of  cases like State Street Bank in deciding that to be eligible for patent 
protection the claimed subject matter must either (1) be tied to a particular machine or (2) transform 
a particular article.40  It’s difficult to imagine judges or anyone else viewing the precipitous drop in 
                                                
38 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir., 2007). 
39 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir., 2007). 
40 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)(en banc), petition for cert. granted, sub nom, Bilski v. Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (Jun 01, 
2009).  Given the oral argument in the case before the Supreme Court, it was likely that the predictable approach of  cases like 
Diehr, Alappat, and State Street Bank was not likely to be embraced by The Court at that time.  While The Court’s majority 
opinion in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010) appeared to leave State Street Bank intact by not only briefly citing that case, 
the reference was not positive.  130 S.Ct. at 3231 (“nothing in today's opinion should be read as endorsing interpretations of  § 
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their own stock accounts caused by the fall 2008 economic collapse as not being a meaningful 
transformation; and yet the claim at issue in Bilski was directed to a process of  managing financial 
risk of  exactly that type.  As a result, it looks like the definitional line drawing that will have to be 
done after Bilski to determine how much of  a transformation in risk41 or financial value is 
sufficiently transformative is at least as unpredictable as it was during the period of  greatest recent 
uncertainty in this area – between the Supreme Court’s 1972 Benson42 and 1981 Diehr decisions.  This 
type of  “know it when you see it” decision making by a court re-injects massive uncertainty into the 
law of  patentable subject matter.   
While flexibility sounds attractive whether used in these areas or others, it has a serious 
Achilles Heel.  By increasing the discretion of  government bureaucrats, flexibility increases 
uncertainty, not decreases it, and it gives a built-in advantage to large companies with hefty lobbying 
and litigation budgets. That’s a big reason why some big firms want it.  And even if  certain, it is now 
certainly much harder to get patents in this area.   
III. HOW LIABILITY RULES FRUSTRATE DEALS  
A central and underexplored problem with liability rules is that they seriously frustrate the 
ability for the patentee to attract and hold the constructive attention of  a potential contracting party 
                                                                                                                                                       
101 that the Court of  Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used in the past,” and citing State Street Bank).  Treatment in the other 
opinions was more negative, leaving an overall Section 101 jurisprudence about as uncertain as it was before the Bilski line of  
cases begasn in the Federal Circuit. 
41 Would you feel you had been meaningfully transformed if  you were warned sufficiently in advance to step aside from 
the freight train fast approaching you from behind?   
42 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).   
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while preserving the option to terminate the negotiations in favor of  striking a deal with a different 
party.  This comparative effectiveness of  property rules in achieving these goals is the mechanism by 
which property rules facilitate both innovation and competition.  That is, property rules help get 
done the deals needed to build the small- and medium-sized business that create new lines of  
business to compete against existing ones.   
A. Direct Impact of  Recent Changes from Property to Liability Rules 
Many scholars have focused on the relative overall information costs and transaction costs 
of  liability rules compared with property rules, and the way liability rules tend to overall provide 
lower compensation than property rules.43  In addition, Haddock, McChesney, and Speigel have 
explored the threat posed by a large number of  potential takers in the liability rule setting and its net 
impact in decreasing ex ante incentives to invest in the underlying entitlement.44   
                                                
43 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of  The Cathedral: The Dominance of  Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997) 
(information costs and transaction costs); Robert P. Merges, Of  Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
2655 (1994) (same); Henry E. Smith, The Language of  Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2003) (same); 
Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of  Determining Property Rules and Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the 
Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 267, 268 n.8 (2002) (elucidating analytical framework for assessing “the relative burden (or costs, 
or difficulty) faced by judges when attempting to determine property rules and liability rules”); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996) (undercompensation); see also Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 732-33 n.61 (1996) 
(same).    
44 David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1990); 
F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 733 (2001).   
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Yet, the literature has not devoted much focus to the mechanism by which actual breakdown 
in bargaining occurs (the “bargain effect” of  property rules), let alone to the way the credible threat 
of  exclusion associated with a published patent acts like a beacon in the dark, drawing to itself  all 
those interested in the patented subject matter (a “beacon effect”).  Knowing there is a good chance 
that a court employing a liability rule approach will set a lower price than the IP owner would accept, 
some potential infringers may first try for a low damage award from the court, rather than 
consummate a deal up front with the IP owner, and then later make a deal if  the court award is too 
high. The prospect that infringement may be an attractive option to some can decrease the 
incentives for all others to attempt or consummate a deal up front, thereby weakening both the 
beacon effect and the bargain effect that are associated with property rules.45 
The decrease in incentives in part occurs because each potential taker must worry about 
other potential takers following suit.  That is, liability rules for one mean non-exclusive licenses for 
all.   
The problem also is due to the way in which the incentive to consummate a deal is decreased 
by the availability of  the option to get a court to force the deal.  A central argument in favor of  
liability rule treatment is that it is most needed as pressure release for those cases in which one side 
to a negotiation is acting irrationally or strategically and simply not getting along with the other.  But, 
if  the ability to avoid the property rule treatment hinged upon the failure of  a deal getting done, 
then there would be a markedly increased incentive for those wanting to obtain use through court-
                                                
45 See, F. Scott Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Information: A Response to Smith’s Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101 (2007); F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to 
Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327 (2006).   
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ordered terms to resist striking licensing deals.  A legal test that rewards a failure to cooperate would 
lead to a decrease, rather than an increase in cooperation.46  Simply put, instead of  the problem 
being a fear that the patentee is engaging in a hold-out or a hold-up game against the one desiring 
use, the problem will instead become that the patentee will be unable to hold its potentially 
bargaining partner in the negotiation, since that partner will instead want to engage in tactics 
designed to make the patentee act irrationally, such as by engaging in a proverbial Three Stooges 
poke in the eye, and then run off  to simply wait for the court to issue what the Federal Circuit in 
Paice v. Toyota refused to call a compulsory license.47   
What is more, not only is the patentee unable to hold this party in a negotiation, the patentee 
is unable to hold-on to the option to end the negotiation and deal with some other user over an 
exclusive license or assignment.  That is, not all deals should get done and liability rule treatment 
forces them to get done.   
What is worse, it appears that in the post eBay world the only party who can count on an 
injunction will be a large manufacturing entity.  Ironically, these are the parties who need the 
protection of  the injunction the least.  First off, large players will usually be better able to finance the 
litigation and so bring a more credible threat to bear against infringers.  Second, large players are 
more likely than small players to be able to keep their potential contract counterparts engaged in a 
contract relationship without the credible threat of  the injunction, relying instead on broader 
relationships, reputation effects, and bargaining power.       
                                                
46 Id.   
47 See supra note 25, and accompanying text.   
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B. Other Deal Breaking Changes in Rules about Patent Contracts 
In addition to the recent shift toward overall liability rule treatment generally frustrating the 
ability of  a patentee get done appropriate deals, another set of  recent changes further frustrate that 
ability for the patentee to even settle or avoid cases.  These involve the law governing two areas of  
contracting over patents, as discussed below.   
1. Inability to Settle or Avoid Litigation after the Medimmune Case 
Invoking some kind of  general and non-statutory public policy against those patents that 
enjoy a statutory presumption of  validity,48 but that are likely to be held invalid by a court if  
adjudicated, the Supreme Court decided in the 1969 Lear case to allow a party to a patent license to 
contest the validity of  the licensed patent even if  there is an express promise in the contract license 
to not raise such a challenge.49  The general rule of  Lear had been interpreted to require a challenger 
to do more than simply stop paying the royalties or performing the other obligations under the 
contract – he must also go so far as to formally challenge the patent’s validity.50   
The balance these cases created essentially gave the licensee the benefit of  not being bound 
to his promise to not challenge, but at the same time saddled the licensee with the obligation to 
actually walk away from the entire license agreement when challenging the patent.  The basic point 
                                                
48 35 U.S.C. § 282.   
49 Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); see also Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 
1970) (Lear applies to exclusive licensees); Bull v. LogEtronics, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Va. 1971) (Lear applies to 
assignees).   
50 See, e.g., Rite-Nail Packaging Corp. v. Berryfast, Inc., 706 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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was that the challenger could renegotiate the entire deal by electing to challenge, but could not 
selectively hold the patentee to all terms binding the patentee while allowing the licensee to have a 
shot at renegotiating some decrease in payment or other obligation once patent had been 
adjudicated invalid.   
Concerned that this balance of  interests was out of  alignment, the January 2007 Supreme 
Court decision in Medimmune makes it particularly easy for the licensee to bring such a challenge by 
no longer requiring the licensee to have to go all the way to break the entire license contract itself, 
instead allowing the licensee to challenge while keeping the patentee bound by the remaining 
contract terms.51  The court in that case held that the patent licensee in that case was “not required, 
insofar as Article III is concerned, to break or terminate its 1997 license agreement before seeking a 
declaratory judgment in federal court that the underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not 
infringed.” 
Some might think that a contractual work around to this case is the use of  an express 
provision in the contract promising not to challenge the validity of  the patent.  But the broad public 
policy articulated in cases like Lear does not on its own terms have a constraint against being read so 
broadly as to make such a contractual provision against that public policy, and thereby unenforceable 
as against public policy or unenforceable as pre-empted by a federal policy.  In addition, it is not 
clear what the remedy would be for such a breach.  Lear itself  prevents an injunction against 
challenging since Lear allows for a challenge in the face of  a non-challenge promise.  It also is not 
clear what the damages would be.  Even if  the expectation damages were viewed as including the 
                                                
51 See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
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cost of  litigation, in most of  these cases the central goal of  the patentee will be to either keep the 
licensee bound to all terms or to leave both parties unbound to any terms.  It is not at all clear that 
some damages award could achieve either of  these goals even if  a court were included to try to 
award it.  For example, some scholars, like Sean O’Connor, have suggested that parties enter into 
structured deals with stock and stock options in the licensee, to provide the patentee with a 
functional equivalent to a patent royalty stream.52   A central shortcoming of  approaches like these is 
the shortcoming the plagues any damages award.  Damages don’t cover for the many non-price 
terms that are in patent license agreements – after all, if  patent license agreements were only about 
price they would be a single sentence listing price instead of  being many pages in length.  But patent 
license agreements are often very textured contracts having many terms, including price and a host 
of  seemingly esoteric and unique provisions—such as technical support, field-of-use or territory 
limitations, grant-backs, cross-licenses, payment schedules, and most-favored-nation provisions.   
As a result, it is likely that parties will pursue other contractual work arounds.  If  maintaining 
the enforceability of  these non-financial clauses is important to contracting parties, then one 
approach they might adopt is to split their patent licenses deals into two bundles, with one set of  
deals each being labeled as a simple patent license for a stated price, with the recognition that this 
one may be avoided through a one-sided challenge as in Medimmune, and the second set being a 
single deal arranging through a complex relational contract the many other important terms.  At 
least two problems arise with this strategy:  it increases the overall social costs of  contracting with 
                                                
52 Sean O’Connor, Using Stock and Stock Options to Minimize Patent Royalty Payment Risks after MedImmune v. Genentech, 3 
N.Y.U. J. LAW & BUS. 381 (2007). 
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little social benefit; or the complexity of  such sets of  deals will be pierced as courts treat them as 
essentially a single deal subject to the same treatment as in Medimmune.   
The bottom line is that the medium and strong readings of  Lear and Medimmune suggest that 
patentee’s will always have to recognize that when they give “peace” from litigation by executing a 
license agreement they will not be able to at the same time gain “peace” from litigation.  This 
substantially reduces incentives to license by removing the central element – mutual and symmetrical 
“peace” -- from the economics of  a licensing transaction.  A license is a promise not to sue and 
those promises are now only enforceable one-way, which means they are of  significantly less value to 
both sides of  the deal.   
2. Disincentive to Settle or Avoid Litigation after the Quanta Case 
In June 2008 the Supreme Court issued it’s most recent patent decision in Quanta v. LG,53 
which involves a patentee’s decision to settle out a dispute with one party, Intel, but giving that party 
a limited license for that party’s own use.  The contract in that case expressly provided that Intel’s 
customers would not be licensed under the patent and expressly required Intel to give notice to 
those customers of  this lack of  license.  Those customers were large computer manufacturers on 
actual notice of  this lack of  license and yet brought their case to the Supreme Court arguing that the 
patentee in effect created an improper restrictive covenant running with the computer chips.   
It made sense for Intel and the patentee to enter into this limited license because essentially, 
the patentee and Intel were entering into a blanket settlement of  IP cases that bought Intel freedom, 
                                                
53 Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics, 128 S.Ct. 2109 (2008).   
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but only bought freedom for Intel.  Intel needed the freedom because, for example, Intel might 
otherwise have been guilty of  inducing third parties to infringe when it sold its products, computer 
chips.  This settlement made clear that it let Intel free but not Intel’s customers, and the price 
reflected this limited ambition.   
The petitioner in the case successfully argued that the so-called first sale doctrine makes the 
broad unrestricted license required.  Under the long established view of  this doctrine, a patentee’s 
unrestricted voluntary introduction of  a patented article into commerce, such as through a sale, may 
prevent the patentee from exercising his right to exclude others from the particular article so 
introduced.  For example, a patentee who makes an unrestricted sale of  a patented widget may not 
be able to sue the buyer, or any other downstream user of  that particular widget for infringement.  
After all, the buyer presumably paid the patentee not only for title to the good in the sales sense, but 
also for permission to use it for its intended purpose.  Thus, the first sale doctrine was long viewed 
safely as a contract-based doctrine that implied into contracts for unrestricted sales of  patented 
articles a term that conveyed some authority to use the article free from a suit for infringement.  But 
this long-established view of  the doctrine treated it as merely a default rule, because courts had long 
recognized that restrictive terms in a sale – such as a sale accompanied by a promise to make only a 
single use of  the patented article – would be enforceable as long as they do not violate some other 
rule of  positive law, is not adhesionary, or unconscionable, etc.54   
Importantly, in general when you buy something you are not entitled to think that it is free 
of  a patent -- especially if  you are a large commercial player.  Under the long established view of  the 
                                                
54 See Mallinkrodt v Medipart, 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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first sale doctrine it only got triggered if  you bought the patented thing from the patentee, because it 
made sense in that case for you to have thought that you were buying a thing and also a license to 
use the thing under the patent – that’s presumably why you bought it from the patentee rather than 
from someone else or made it yourself.  The key was your reasonable impression as a buyer that you 
were getting a license.  In Quanta, the “buyers” only came to know of  Intel’s license by reading it, 
and its text made explicit that only Intel was licensed and not Intel’s customers.  So, there was on the 
facts no chance of  confusion or mistake or duress etc.  Quite the opposite, the buyer had to argue 
that it was seduced into thinking it was licensed by reading only half  the document that seduced it.  
But that seems to be what the Supreme Court decided.   
The Court’s decision in the case creates a very strong disincentive to settle a case with any 
one of  the many possible infringers in a market.  In view of  Quanta, any such settlement is now 
likely to create some kind of  license that could be used to launder all other members of  the market.  
As a result, now settlements may have to be with all at a very high price or with none at all.   
A range of  structured work-arounds may be attempted after Quanta.  Each is discussed 
below and each may be used alone or in combination with the others.  But it is not clear whether any 
of  these will be viewed by courts as being consistent with the broad policy statements made in the 
Quanta opinion.  As a result, and as with attempted work arounds for Medimmune, costs of  
transacting may increase with little benefit, or the attempted fixes may not even work.   
The first attempted fix for Quanta is to make clear that the contract being struck is not, in 
fact, a patent license.  Under this approach, the contract should be labeled as a “restricted and 
limited agreement to release and not sue.”  All operative clauses should avoid using the word 
“license” and its variants and instead use variants of  the phrase “restricted and limited agreement to 
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release and not sue.”  To the extent that The Court in Quanta is making broad statements about 
federal patent policy that impact patent licenses, structuring the deal in this suggested fashion places 
the deal more outside of  the reach of  that potential policy of  federal patent law.  Indeed, this 
approach also places the deal more within the zone of  more favored policy of  resolving and 
avoiding federal court litigation, a policy that is federal itself  and so is not merely a matter of  state 
contract law of  the type that might be preempted by a potentially conflicting federal patent policy.   
The second attempted fix, which assumes the parties strongly prefer labeling their contract a 
patent license, is to make clear in all references to the license in that contract, especially in the grant 
clause, that the license is, itself, on its own terms, restricted. The Quanta case and many patent first 
sale cases focus a great deal on there being an “unrestricted sale.”  To increase the chance that the 
parties take their license out of  the reach of  those cases the parties should be sure to explicitly 
restrict all licenses and all sales of  patented subject matter.  That is, the license should be restricted 
to whatever limits they want to place on it and in addition it should be restricted to reaching only 
those sales that are themselves made in a way that is expressly restricted.   
The third strategy uses two guidelines that come from the Quanta decision itself.  The Court 
in Quanta stated that so-called “patent exhaustion” occurs when: (1) the only “reasonable and 
intended use” of  the component product sold was to practice the combination or method patent; 
and (2) the component product sold “embodies essential features” of  the  combination or method 
patent.  As a result, the more the parties take a range steps in the contract to make clear that the 
parties to not intend to have certain uses meet both of  these tests, the more a court may determine 
those uses are not covered by the reach of  “patent exhaustion.”  For example, if  the contract can 
make clear what uses are “intended” and what uses are not, the more likely a later court will 
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determine that “patent exhaustion” is not triggered.  The central concern with this approach is that 
some courts may make their own determination of  what use is reasonable and extend patent 
exhaustion to reach all of  those uses regardless of  the language in the contract to the contrary.   
The fourth strategy is to make sure that any restrictions or limits or obligations etc. that are 
associated with any grant are expressly structured as conditions rather than as contractual obligations. 
This is because if  a contracting party does not meet all of  its contractual obligations then the only 
recourse is a suit for breach for which the remedy will be at most expectation damages.  Moreover, 
only those breaches that are material will give rise to a cause of  action, since substantial performance 
is all that many courts require.  In contrast, if  a material condition is not met then the benefit the 
party seeks from the patentee is not itself  triggered.  The recourse for the patentee is more 
automatic and complete – the permission, or the license, or the promise not to sue, etc. would not 
be given.   
Only further empirical research will let us know which, if  any, of  these several contractual 
work-arounds to Medimmune and Quanta are tried, whether they work, etc.  But one effect that is 
likely to evolve is that the most stable patent licenses after these cases will be those cross licensing 
large portfolios, because only those types of  licenses avoid the need for both precise evaluation and 
firm commitment for each patent – what holds together deals of  that type is fear of  mutually 
assured destruction, or symmetrical threat of  large numbers of  litigations.  If  this prediction is 
correct, then the outcome will be a web of  contractual arrangements between large players to the 
exclusion of  market entrants, which is decidedly anticompetitive.   
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The many recent changes to the patent system through court decisions over the years have 
synergistically interacted with each other to leave the patent system seriously lacking in property 
rules, especially for small market entrants trying to sue or license larger more established market 
participants, and except perhaps for large established participants when suing market entrants.  The 
stated purpose of  stripping away this protection was to facilitate bargaining and avoid hold out and 
hold up effects.  But while the property literature has long recognized and endeavored to mitigate 
the problems of  property rules, we now face the problems of  liability rules without the aid of  a 
developed set of  tools for mitigating them.   
There are several basic intuitions underlying the problem caused by using liability rules only.   
First, while liability rules force deals, some deals just shouldn’t get done.  Second, a rule that allows 
for liability rule intervention in those cases where the parties disagree on deal terms encourages 
disagreement and frustrates transactions.  Third, and most importantly, liability rules make it 
significantly more difficult for owners of  IP rights like patents to attract and hold the constructive 
attention of  a potential contracting party (can’t hold-in the counterparty), and eliminate the 
patentee’s option to terminate the negotiations in favor of  striking a deal with a different party (can’t 
hold-on to option).  This problem hits small firms worse than large firms because large firms have 
an easier time keeping their contracting parties tethered to deals through various devices such as 
bargaining power, access to resources needed to finance litigation and its threat, and reputation 
effects. Fourth, liability rules actually help large established firms to coordinate with each other in an 
anticompetitive fashion to keep out market entrants.   
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Worse yet, the problems that have recently been introduced into the patent system through 
the removal of  property rule treatment are only compounded by shifts in other rules governing 
patent contracts.  Even when patent deals are struck they no longer seem to be enforced post 
Medimmune.  Alternatively, the licenses that a patentee does grant one party may be granted to all 
third party buyers after Quanta, thereby creating a strong disincentive to even attempt to strike deals 
through patent settlements and other licenses.     And the only firms well positioned to mitigate the 
transaction inhibiting effects of  these new contract law rules are those large firms that can use a 
strategy of  swapping large portfolios of  patent licenses, thereby further enhancing their ability to 
coordinate with each other to keep out market challengers.   
The bottom line is that under the patent system newly created by the courts, it is very hard 
to see how patents can have significant positive effect in facilitating the coordination and contracting 
that can lead to increased competition and access.  Instead, the prevalence of  liability enforcement 
rules and mandatory and prohibitory contracting rules may actually be causing a substantial negative 
impact, the keiretsu effect of  facilitating collusive anticompetitive coordination among large 
established market participants.55 While this essay does not endeavor to celebrate the original version 
of  our patent system that was created by the Framers of  our Constitution, or to speak out against 
progress or even change, the problems it explores, which are seriously under-explored, if  not totally 
ignored, by most of  the contemporary literature, combine to make the present system a strong 
candidate for change in the opposite direction called for by most other commentators.   
                                                
55 See, F. Scott Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Information: A Response to Smith’s Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101 (2007), F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to 
Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327 (2006). 
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Nevertheless, it is essential to keep in mind that even the present system, with its increased 
access to liability rules, is still a far cry from a full compulsory licensing system that some might 
advocate.  The essential distinction here is between the compulsory licensing that involves a plea to 
the government for an exemption accompanied by some very modest payment, often from the 
government itself, and each of  the detailed mechanisms that a party seeking to use a patented 
invention must employ to even take advantage of  the various liability rules discussed in this essay.  
At a minimum, this distinction should be preserved to prevent the US from becoming a compulsory 
licensing regime.   
* * * * * 
